The Structural Crisis of Military Dominance in Sudan

Counselor. Mohamed Elsir Massaad

The hegemony of the military establishment over the reins of political and governmental decision-making in the Sudanese state constitutes the structural crisis that has been entrenched since the first military coup against constitutional legitimacy in Sudan, and it persists until this very moment.

This reality will not change except through the awakening of the national consciousness of the Sudanese people and the decisive return of these military leaders to their natural, exclusive, and specialized domain—the state's military and security sector—and their permanent exclusion from involvement in political affairs and state governance.

Any individual among them who desires to work within the political and governmental sphere must first submit their resignation from the military and security sector. It is utterly unacceptable to exploit a military position for the purpose of governance, especially since this kind of leadership often springs from a mindset that is ill-suited to managing the complex political and societal affairs of a state.

Despite the successes that could be attributed to the former President, Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir, which were partially due to his personal leadership but largely to the efficacy of the political organization he headed at the time, his errors were nonetheless grave and catastrophic. His decisions were often dominated by militaristic impulses and immediate, swashbuckling bravado at the expense of strategic political awareness and foresight.

The prime example of this is the arming and formation of the so-called Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was essentially a tribal façade, whose core component hailed from the Rizeigat tribe. This force was introduced into the state's conflict against armed movements that had rebelled against the state at the time, whose members primarily belonged to the Zaghawa tribe.

The question is pressing: Where was the strategic political mind of the state, its military, and security institutions when this shattering step was taken? What is even more alarming is that despite the unequivocal rejection voiced by influential and weighty political leaders within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) at the time—such as Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Professor Amin Hassan Omar, and even Lieutenant General Salah Gosh (who, in his later vengeance, contributed to the destruction of his own state)—Field Marshal al-Bashir used his absolute powers as President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and ignored their pleas that strongly opposed the establishment of a government military force on a narrow, tribal basis from the Rizeigat.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) hold a deeply rooted and profound position in the national consciousness of the people; they are the subject of their adoration, trust, and the source of their national pride, and their officers are held in high esteem. However, this vicious cycle of recurring crisis, where the threads of politics are entangled with military might, which tragically culminated in the war of April 15, 2023, must be closed definitively and irrevocably.

It is incumbent upon all of us to work with absolute seriousness and zero tolerance to dismantle the dominance of any military leadership—whether in the Sovereign Council or within the military's structures—that seeks to impose the final word and refuses to be challenged in matters concerning the fate of the state and the people. This is what we absolutely and categorically reject.

Furthermore, out of respect for the Army's role as the protector of the homeland, it is essential for us to establish a new, solemn social contract. This contract should ensure that the President of the Republic remains a perpetual nominee of the Sudanese Army's Command Authority, provided that this position remains strictly sovereign and purely symbolic, entirely stripped of any governmental executive powers.

Conversely, political parties and entities shall fulfill their responsibility through democratic competition for parliamentary seats in regular general elections every five years. The political force that secures the majority shall name the Prime Minister, who will form their government in consultation with the victorious parties, and ministerial portfolios shall be distributed among the parties according to their political weight and the importance of the portfolio.

Unless we rectify and firmly establish our solemn social contract and the foundations of sound and judicious governance and administration, the structural crises in the Sudanese state will endure, affecting everyone ad infinitum.